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ABSTRACT

International Policy Diffusion and Religious Freedom, 1990-2008

by

Allison R. Hale, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2017

Major Professor: Dr. Greg Goelzhauser
Department: Political Science

Why do governments restrict religious freedom? As more and more governments
have adopted restrictive policies over the past thirty years, scholars have traditionally
examined domestic factors that may influence government choices. I build on this literature
by extending the discussion to external factors, proposing that mechanisms of international
policy diffusion contribute to the adoption of restrictive government religion policy. Further
developing the policy diffusion literature with an examination of restrictive policies, I
advance the argument that several specific mechanisms—such as geography, learning,
imitation, or social construction—are more closely interrelated than many previous studies
assume.
To test these theoretical assumptions, I compile a dataset that captures years of policy
adoption for twenty types of restrictive government religion policy based on the information
available from the Religion and State (RAS) Project for 175 countries between 1990 and
2008. Applying logistic regression models to conduct basic event history analysis, I find

iv

moderate support for the assumption that all four of the policy mechanisms examined
increase the odds of restrictive policy adoption.
(74 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

International Policy Diffusion and Religious Freedom, 1990-2008
Allison R. Hale

Why do governments restrict religious freedom? As more and more governments
have adopted restrictive policies over the past thirty years, scholars have traditionally
examined internal domestic factors—such as the role of democratic governance, economic
growth, or internal competition—that may influence government choices. I build on this
literature by extending the discussion to external factors, arguing that some policies may also
spread from one government to another. This process, identified by scholars as the idea of
policy diffusion, may occur in several ways.
While previous research has focused on the spread of policies that are generally
considered positive (i.e. the spread of democracy), I extend the literature by specifically
focusing on the spread of restrictive policies. I argue that these policies may spread across
countries through several specific mechanisms: geographic neighbors may observe each
other, policymakers may learn generally from the adoption of policies throughout the world,
countries may imitate the examples of others they consider powerful, or the merits of a policy
may be socially constructed within groups of countries that have similar cultures.
To examine these theoretical assumptions, I first compile a dataset that captures years
of policy adoption for twenty types of restrictive government religion policy based on the
information available from the Religion and State (RAS) Project for 175 countries between
1990 and 2008. I then test the data with several statistical models that allow me to compare
the extent to which the proposed mechanisms change the likelihood that a government will
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adopt a restrictive policy. Through these tests, I find moderate statistical support for the
assumption that all four of the policy mechanisms examined increase the odds of restrictive
policy adoption.
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INTRODUCTION

In June 2016, Pew Research Center reported that up to 74 percent of the world’s
population lives in countries with high or very high levels of government regulation of
religion (“Trends in Global Restrictions on Religion”). For example, Christian communities
in China have seen “numerous churches bulldozed and crosses torn down” by the
government (USCIRF 2016). Muslim women in at least twelve countries are subject to full or
partial bans that prohibit the burka or other similar forms of religious dress (Sanghani 2016;
USCIRF 2016b). Recent “anti-terrorism” legislation in Russia bans any form of preaching,
praying, proselytizing, and dissemination of religious material outside of state-approved
religious sites, and “authorize[s] fines of up to $15,000 for these activities conducted in
private residences or distributed through mass print, broadcast, or online media” (USCIRF
2016c). Throughout several countries, prisoners of conscience—“people whom governments
hold for reasons including those related to religion”—are regularly incarcerated and in some
cases, subject to the death penalty (USCIRF 2016).
Moreover, between 2007 and 2013, Pew observed that the number of countries in
which governments specifically targeted, restricted, or harassed religious groups increased
from 118 to 133 (“Latest Trends In Religious Restrictions and Hostilities”). Additional
academic studies further confirm that the overall level of government involvement in religion
(GIR)—that is, government restrictions on religious practice, direct or indirect government
support for religion, or other legislation that controls religious behavior in some way—has
largely increased over time, and religious legislation remains “ubiquitous” even in countries
that constitutionally separate religion and state (Fox 2006, 2011a). Additional studies seem to
confirm that a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom seems to only translate to
minimal protection of individual rights in practice (Fox 2015, Fox and Flores 2009; Chilton
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and Versteeg 2014). Yet even as individual governments increasingly regulate religion,
prominent intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations continue to champion
and uphold the right of individuals to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion,”
including the right to “change his religion or belief” and to “manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship, and observance” (United Nations 1948).
Why, then, do governments seem increasingly willing to adopt restrictive policies to
regulate religious practice and expression? Since Berry and Berry (1990) first examined the
adoption of a state lottery across the United States to understand whether or not public
policies may predictably spread from one polity to another, a significant body of literature
examining the mechanisms of policy diffusion has developed across several subfields of
political science (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013).
This task is particularly difficult for scholars of international policy diffusion. As
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006, 789) summarized,
The challenge facing theorists of international policy diffusion is to demonstrate that
domestic political and economic factors cannot alone predict when governments
adopt new policies, and to develop and test hypotheses that distinguish among the
several possible mechanisms of diffusion.
In short, the assumption that nations internally develop public policy independently from one
another is juxtaposed against an assumption of policy interdependence, under which nations
develop public policies as informed by some sense of the international community around
them (Franzese and Hays 2008).
I examine these competing arguments with respect to government regulation of
religion, assessing the likelihood that a country will adopt a regulation in a given year by
statistically testing data newly compiled from the Religion and State (RAS) project, V-Dem
database, Correlates of War project, and World Bank. Using these data, I evaluate policy
adoption in several different categories of regulation—such as laws addressing religious
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speech, observance, organizations, and proselyting—across 175 countries between 1990 and
2008. I find moderate statistical support for the assumption that restrictive government
religion policies are diffusing across countries through several possible mechanisms; future
study, however, will be necessary to further clarify which specific mechanisms can best
predict policy adoption in this case. These results expand the current political science
literature on religion-state relationships by looking beyond purely domestic factors that may
influence policy adoption, and extend discussions in the diffusion literature about the best
ways to conceptualize and measure diffusion mechanisms.
First, I situate this study within the general literature on the relationship between
governments and religion, specifically exploring the implications of studying explicit
government restrictions on religious activity. Then, I build on existing diffusion literature to
develop hypotheses about specific mechanisms that may account for the international
diffusion of government policies restricting religion. Within this theoretical framework, I
outline my empirical approach; in addition to operationalizing my hypotheses on diffusion
mechanisms, I draw on literature in comparative politics and international relations to
account for relevant domestic factors that may contribute to policy adoption. After evaluating
my results, I conclude by briefly discussing the implications of this study for future work in
political science.

4
PREVIOUS LITERATURE

Studying Religion and State
Studying religion in society is inherently difficult. In many fields, simply defining
what constitutes “religion,” much less attempting to understand the overlap between religion
and society, has been the subject of intense analysis and debate (Hulsether 2005; Nongbri
2008). Even narrowing the subject to focus just on the interaction of religion and politics is
fraught with challenges. Recently warning scholars and policymakers of the “instability and
even incoherence of the category of religion as [a] basis of legal protection,” Elizabeth
Shakman Hurd argues that “the adoption of religion as a legal and policy category helps to
create the world that it purports to oversee” and in so doing oversimplifies our view of social
relations (2015, 110-111). As such, she suggests that scholars ought to “dethrone religion as
a stable interpretive and policy category” in their research (114).
In short, Hurd suggests that because governments approach “religion policy”
differently over time or apply such policies unevenly across different religious, spiritual, or
non-religious communities in society, that the concept of “religion policy” cannot be
systematically studied as such by political scientists. Acknowledging the complexity of the
task, however, I disagree with Hurd’s logic and concur with Ani Sarkissian’s recent
conclusion: “By ignoring religion or incorporating it into analyses of other types of identities,
we may risk missing the essential role it plays in the politics of many societies” (2015, 6).
Governments around the world have arguably sought to restrict, support, or control religion
since at least the fourteenth century BCE and, as highlighted in the introduction to this paper,
continue to do so today (Sarkissian 2015, 1-3). While government religion policies—either
codified in law or in consistent government practice—are observable, however, many early
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scholars failed to evaluate such policies systematically.
Admittedly, early scholarship often focused more generally on the role or influence
of religion in society as a cultural force, and weighed in—implicitly or explicitly—to the
normative debate over the “appropriate” balance of religion and state. Modernization and
secularization theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, for instance, largely
assumed that as countries became more modernized, both the role of religion in the public
sphere and private religiosity would decline (Almond 1960; Apter 1965; Beckford 1985;
Deutsch 1953; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Smith 1970, 1974; Westhus 1976; Wilson 1966,
1982).
The secularization school was a prominent influence on the social scientific study of
religion through the 1990s “and perhaps a bit later,” as Jonathan Fox (2015) explains. He
outlines at least two significant effects that this emphasis had on the literature: “First, it
arguably deterred research on the topic,” as scholars assumed religion would become
increasingly irrelevant; “second, it forced much of the research that did exist to spend its
efforts refuting secularization theory rather than building knowledge on the relationship
between religion and politics” (Fox 2015: 25). As Roger Finke observes, religion-state
relationships had been “virtually ignored in international studies. Prior to 2000, there were no
systematic data collections on religious freedoms and few studies attempted to understand the
origins or consequences of these freedoms” (2013).
By the late twentieth century, however, a few new theories began to emerge to
explain how religion could become an increasingly salient force throughout the world
(Antoun and Hegland 1987; Casanova 1994; Kepel 1994; Sahliyeh 1990; Westerlund 1996).
For example, Huntington’s prominent and controversial theory about a “clash of
civilizations”—which argues that conflict and competition between several religiously
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homogeneous civilizations will dominate international politics—has been subject to
intensive debate as scholars have sought to better understand the potential role of religion and
religious identities in driving international conflict in the post-Cold War world (Fox 2005;
Huntington 1996; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Mungiu-Pippidi and Mindruta 2002; Russett,
Oneal, and Cox 2000).
Yet while many have continued to evaluate a culturally-based assumption that
“religion engenders conflict and cooperation” (as evidenced in part by the publication of
extensive surveys such as the Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security (Seiple, Hoover
and Otis 2012) or the Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding (Omer,
Appleby and Little 2015)), relatively few scholars have methodically explored or empirically
tested concrete ways in which religion and governments interact or the ways that different
forms of institutionalized religion-state relationships may influence (or be influenced by)
conflict behavior or other outcomes.
In short, a new body of literature on government religion policy has been slowly
developing since roughly 2000 (Philpott 2009). Several important studies focus primarily on
the potential causal impact of government policy on other outcomes. One important step
forward in this endeavor is Grim and Finke’s The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious
Persecution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (2011). With a combination of large-n
empirical analysis and a series of case studies, Grim and Finke find that when governments
restrict religious freedom, the likelihood of violent persecution, conflict, and terrorism within
a country increases.
Specifically, they argue that government and social restrictions of religion are a
mechanism “through which social, political, economic, and religious differences make a
difference” in predicting levels of social and political stability and conflict (2011: 86).
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Interestingly, measures of government favoritism of religion were not statistically
significant when included; although correlated with higher restrictions of religious freedom,
observing government favoritism of religion was less directly effective in predicting conflict
(2011: 209-210). Citing a separate Hudson Institute study, Grim and Finke note “wherever
the level of religious freedom is high, there tends to be fewer incidents of armed conflict,
better health outcomes, higher levels of earned income, prolonged democracy, and better
educational opportunities for women” (2011: 206). Reflecting on religious freedom as part of
a “bundle of freedoms,” Grim and Finke conclude that significant research remains to
disentangle causal relationships as religious freedom is increasingly “associated with many
positive outcomes” (2011: 206).
Additional literature has begun to explore the potential impact of religious cultures
and government regulation of religion on economic outcomes. Early studies attempted to link
economic development and the rise of capitalism to the dominance of Protestantism in a
country, although this assertion has been questioned (Guiso et al. 2003; Iannccone 1998;
Weber 1930 (2001); Landes 1998). In terms of the religion-state relationship, Barro and
McCleary (2005) analyze the economic implications of whether or not a country has an
established state religion at three specific points in the last century (1900, 1970, 2000), but
find little relationship between established religion and per capita GDP. Gill (2013) explores
several potential mechanisms that would link positive economic outcomes to the provision of
religious freedom; Grim, Clark, and Snyder (2014) argue specifically that religious freedom
contributes to good “business and economic outcomes” even after controlling for other
political or social factors. While these types of studies are interesting, they still emphasize
religion policy as the independent variable.
Only a few recent studies, in fact, have considered reversing the causal direction: can
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economic indicators actually predict the extent to which governments regulate religion?
Theoretically, this claim is just beginning to emerge. Fox (2006), for example, found that
high economic development might actually be correlated with an increased likelihood of
government involvement in religion. Buckley and Mantilla (2013) similarly argue that high
levels of economic development may enable increased regulation of religion through
associated growth in state capacity, finding a “consistently positive” and “substantively
significant” relationship between development and the level of government regulation
targeting religion.
How then, can scholars begin to disentangle the relationship between government
religion policies and other outcomes? I suggest that to better understand the impact of
policies providing religious freedom (relative to more restrictive government policies),
scholars must first understand the conditions that result in high or low levels of government
restriction of religion in the first place. If, as Grim and Finke assert, government religion
policy moderates or amplifies existing differences in a way that can shape conflict behavior
or promote positive economic and social outcomes, it becomes even more important to
understand how and why governments adopt policies that restrict religion.

Origins of Government Religion Policy
Recent studies have begun to explore the domestic origins of religious restrictions or
the deregulation of religion. Building on rational choice theory, the “religious economies”
argument developed primarily by Finke (1990, 2013), Stark and Finke (2000), and Gill
(2008) holds that a government’s regulation or deregulation of religion is largely a result of
competing interests held by politicians and religious leaders. Suggesting that religious groups
compete for resources from the state and that politicians seek to maximize the chances of
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their political survival, Gill (2008) argues that politicians will court religious leaders to gain
legitimacy, particularly in countries with majority religious groups, but will ultimately favor
deregulation as their political position becomes more secure. Despite the prevalence of this
theory throughout new literature, however, as Finke and Martin (2014) acknowledge, “little
empirical work has directly tested these arguments.”
In fact, while a number of studies have begun to consider the relationship between
domestic institutions, economy, or demography and government religion policy, the literature
has failed to arrive at consistent conclusions. Based in part on Gill’s assumptions, Grim and
Finke (2011) extensively discuss potential religious and social motivations for restricting
religious freedom: from the perspective of a dominant religion, to “preserve and protect the
culture and society as a whole,” or to limit competition between religious groups for political
or cultural power (46-50). From the perspective of states, controlling “religious activity by
forming alliances with select religious groups or by restricting the activities of all” allows the
state to “secure political stability and survival by controlling any potential threats from
religion” (50). In short, they theorize that “when politicians view alliances with established
religions as necessary for survival or they perceive religious movements as a potential threat
to the state, religious freedoms will be denied” (51).
Gill’s work and other studies built on the religious economies framework, however,
have more commonly focused on forms of political competition most prominently found in
democracies. Democracies are recognized to generally provide greater protection for human
rights than non-democracies, and therefore may be less likely to adopt restrictions on
religious freedom (Apodaca, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 2005; Davenport, 1995,
1999; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Keith, 2002; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and
Keith, 1999). At the institutional level, however, recent studies suggest that a democratic
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political system or does not seem to necessarily imply a strong separation of religion and
state (Driessen 2010; Fox 2007). More nuanced work suggests that certain features of
democratic governance may matter more than others: Finke and Martin (2014) find that while
free elections or measures of government effectiveness were insignificant in their models, the
absence of an independent judiciary was a strong predictor of religious restrictions.
What about non-democracies? In Varieties of Religious Repression, Ani Sarkissian
(2015) builds on Gill’s (2008) religious economies framework and insights from Grim and
Finke (2011) to develop a theory of religious repression in nondemocratic countries,
acknowledging that the policies, regimes and incentives in nondemocratic states will differ
from those in democracies. She argues that levels of religious repression in a country are a
function of both political competition and religious divisions in society, based on preliminary
quantitative analysis and a number of case studies. In addition to extending the religious
economies framework beyond democracies, Sarkissian’s work notably begins to address
another shortfall of previous work on the subject: the fact that Gill and others primarily frame
their work with a focus on “conditions leading to deregulation of religion,” rather than
spending much time “explaining the conditions that lead to repression of religion, which
studies show has been increasing” (2015: 11).
A recent, detailed analysis of different types of government religion policy across
nearly 200 countries found that between 1990 and 2008, 55 percent of states instituted
new/additional religion policies while only 12 percent removed them (about 16 percent did
some combination of both and 17 percent did not significantly change) (Fox 2015). In fact,
while 90 percent of all countries offer some legal assurance of religious freedom, roughly 86
percent still have laws regulating religious practice (Finke and Martin 2014). As such, I
suggest with Sarkissian that scholars must continue to develop theoretical explanations to
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account for these documented increases in the regulation of religion across the world. As
described above, several authors have begun to explore potential domestic determinants of
state religion policy. I thus expand upon existing literature on religion and state relationships
by looking beyond internal determinants of policy, attempting to evaluate the ways in which
restrictive religion policy may spread across countries.

The Logic of Policy Diffusion
While domestic characteristics are likely to partially predict the adoption of
restrictions, governments in individual countries also observe and interact with one another in
ways that may condition their policy choices. I suggest that theories of policy diffusion may
provide additional insight into a country’s willingness to adopt restrictive government
religion policy. Although the diffusion literature in IR and comparative politics is
comparatively underdeveloped relative to that in the American politics subfield,
“diffusion/contagion processes fit logically in that set of questions which are traditionally
asked by foreign policy or comparative politics analysts” (Most and Starr 1990, 392).
Scholars across subfields largely agree about the generic meaning of policy
“diffusion,” despite slight differences in the way diffusion literature has developed across the
different specialties. At a basic level, Shipan and Volden (2012) define diffusion as “one
government’s policy choices being influenced by the choices of other governments.” Karch
(2007) clarifies, “Diffusion is about the movement of a policy across jurisdictional
boundaries. In contrast, adoption is the decision to establish a policy in an individual
jurisdiction.” Other scholars further emphasize “diffusion as a process, as opposed to an
outcome. That is, diffusion is the interdependent process conducive to the spread of policies,
not the extent of convergence that can result from it” (Gilardi 2012).
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What have scholars learned about the process of policy diffusion thus far? Early
studies of diffusion in the American politics subfield, particularly those that developed
theoretical and methodological approaches allowing for internal and external policy
determinants to be tested together, laid the groundwork for an extensive literature to emerge
during the 1990s and 2000s (Walker 1969, Gray1973, Berry and Berry 1990). Several
authors have previously provided detailed reviews of this literature and draw out key
theoretical “lessons” about policy diffusion based on previous results (Shipan and Volden
2012, Karch 2007, Gilardi 2012). These reviews each suggest that the literature has
developed broadly under three questions succinctly articulated by Karch (2007): first, why
does diffusion occur—that is, what driving forces (referred to as “mechanisms”) result in
diffusion? Second, which political actors or forces (such as policy entrepreneurs or crossborder organizations) facilitate diffusion? Finally, what specific policy content is being
diffused?
In an effort to address these questions, the diffusion literature has grown from basic
studies simply attempting to gauge whether or not diffusion has occurred to increasingly
sophisticated analyses developing detailed theoretical claims about different potential
diffusion mechanisms and actors. For instance, recent work has pioneered new techniques for
evaluating the role of interest groups or advocacy networks as political actors facilitating
diffusion (Garrett and Jansa 2015, Donno 2010).
In terms of policy content, diffusion theory is typically used to explain the spread of
policy “innovations”—defined broadly as programs or policies that are new to the
governments adopting them (Walker 1969). Scholars of American politics have typically
focused their studies on the diffusion of specific types of statutes across state and local
governments, such as the adoption of a state lottery (Berry and Berry 1990), or anti-smoking
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legislation (Shipan and Volden 2008). In international relations and comparative politics,
diffusion scholarship has more broadly attempted to explain the emergence of international
norms of behavior such as the tendency of countries to invite international election observers
(Hyde 2009) or agree to weapons bans (Carpenter 2011), revolutionary “waves” such as the
Arab Spring (Weyland 2012), and the spread of democracy and economic liberalism (Bunce
and Wolchik 2011; Huntington 1991; O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Simmons and Elkins 2004;
Starr 1991; Wotipka and Ramirez 2008; Weyland 2010).
As Maske and Volden (2011) note, however, there has been “limited attention to the
attributes of policies” that may limit the generalizability of previous diffusion studies. “Given
that many studies find policy diffusion while many others do not,” they assert, “the lack of an
overarching emphasis on differences across these policies has limited the potential for
cumulative building of knowledge across studies.” With a few exceptions (such as
Horowitz’s (2010) examination of the spread of suicide bombing tactics across terrorist
organizations), the IR and comparative literature has overwhelmingly focused on the
diffusion of “innovations” in terms of policies or techniques that are typically associated with
the normative ideals of protecting human rights, strengthening democratic institutions, or
improving economic outcomes. As such, this study further contributes to the diffusion
literature by considering the potential diffusion of policies clearly designed to restrict
personal freedoms.

14
INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION MECHANISMS

I attempt to assess whether or not restrictions on religious practice are spreading by
evaluating different mechanisms that have been highlighted in previous literature. The
following subsections develop hypotheses about the spread of restrictive government religion
policy based on four potential diffusion mechanisms: geography, learning, imitation, and
social construction. As outlined below, several scholars have attempted to build on early
analyses based on geography by distinguishing between the ideas of learning, imitation, and
social construction as separate or independent diffusion mechanisms. I argue, however, that
imitation and social construction should just be considered as modified possible forms of
learning.

Geography
Diffusion scholars across disciplines have long considered the potential role of
regional affinity as a mechanism of policy diffusion (Karch 2007). For many, the very
definition and measurement of diffusion is linked with idea of geographic proximity. One
example of a typical definition, provided by Bunce and Wolchik (2011), suggests: “we
understand diffusion to be a process whereby new ideas, institutions, policies, models, or
repertoires of behavior spread geographically from a core site to new sites, whether within a
given state… or across states” (17). Early, prominent studies in both the American and
IR/comparative literature largely focused on the diffusion of policies between neighboring
units or within regional bounds (Berry and Berry 1990; Lutz 1987; Mooney and Lee 1995;
Weyland 2005; Collier and Messick 1975).
Karch (2007) notes that “most published research assumes that the existence of a
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public policy in nearby states provides a model upon which state officials can draw.” He
then outlines three of the most prominent theoretical explanations regularly offered to support
the idea of geographic diffusion: first, the assumption that “geographic proximity… can
facilitate the development of the communications networks among policymakers through
which information about public policies spreads;” second, the idea that “overlapping media
markets may alert citizens and government officials to the existence of political forms and
policies in nearby states;” and third, the assumption that “public officials might be most
inclined to use nearby states as policy models because they are likely to be culturally and
demographically similar to their own states” (Karch 2007).
While some recent papers have revisited the basic idea of spatial/geographic diffusion
(Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Maske and Volden 2011), others have criticized the idea that
geographic proximity, in and of itself, matters. For instance, Shipan and Volden (2012) argue
that “while offering a good starting point, the classic view of policy diffusion as geographic
clustering is often overly limiting, sometimes misleading (or even wrong), and increasingly
outdated.” Most critics emphasize that while regional clustering may have shaped diffusion
in the past, “today’s low barriers to communication and travel” weaken the assumption that
countries primarily obtain information about public policies from their neighbors (Shipan and
Volden 2012, Karch 2007). Moreover, only limited empirical support exists to support the
idea of a regional diffusion effect (Mooney 2001, Karch 2007). As such, scholars have
largely begun to develop and test more specific potential mechanisms of diffusion—often
based in part on assumptions previously associated with geography such as those highlighted
above—on their own terms.
Although I agree with the assertion that “the role of geographic proximity in the
diffusion process is more complicated than most scholars have heretofore suggested,” I
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believe there are still reasons to include and test for the idea of spatial diffusion. First, the
prominence of geographic explanations in the literature suggests that simply ignoring the
possibility without some form of empirical test would be insufficient. Second, although
critics argue that the role of geography should be less prominent as communication and
transportation networks has increased over time and many of the assumptions that justify
studies of geographic diffusion have since been tested through more specific theoretical
mechanisms, these arguments do not fully rule out the basic possibility that geography
matters to some extent. Finally, it seems imprudent to assume that the impact of geographic
proximity on diffusion would necessarily be the same 1) in both subnational and international
studies, or 2) for all types of policy. As such, I briefly address both general and specific
approaches to policy diffusion. Particularly because few studies evaluate the spread of
restrictive or illiberal policies, I begin with a general, geography-focused hypothesis of
spatial diffusion simply to assess the extent to which the diffusion of religious restrictions
may actually occur across countries. Ways to parse out any potential impact of geography as
opposed to other, more specific mechanisms are developed and discussed in the sections that
follow.
H1: The likelihood of adopting religious restrictions increases as the number of policies
adopted by countries within the same geographic region rises.
Learning
Policy diffusion scholars often consider “learning” as a diffusion mechanism.
Although the basic idea—that policymakers learn from experience, examples, and new
information and act accordingly—makes intuitive sense, precisely explaining and testing
learning as a mechanism has proved particularly challenging (Maske and Volden 2011).
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006) take an expansive view similar to the concept of
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Bayesian updating, suggesting that “learning refers to a change in beliefs or change in
one’s confidence in existing beliefs, which can result from exposure to new evidence,
theories, or behavioral repertoires” (see also Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett (2007)). More
fundamentally, Simmons and Elkins (2004) assert that learning occurs any time new
information is acquired.
While an important foundation, however, the idea that the availability of new
information about a policy leads to learning may overly simplify a more complex causal
process. As Simmons and Elkins (2004) acknowledge, information can be acquired in several
different ways. Specifically, they identify policy success, communication (assuming
information is more easily shared among governments that are in especially close
communication), and cultural reference groups as possible diffusion mechanisms. Although
they classify all mechanisms as forms of learning, the majority of diffusion scholars have
focused more on the apparent success of a policy as the relevant information considered by
policymakers in the “learning” process (Gilardi 2012). This perspective is summarized by
Shipan and Volden (2008), who argue, “In learning, policymakers focus on the policy
itself—how was it adopted, was it effective, what were its political consequences?”
Yet while policymakers may “intend to learn from the experiences of others, they are
inherently limited by how the human brain processes new information” (Gilardi 2012). As
such, effectively attempting to measure “learning” based on perceptions of a policy’s
“success”—in effect, attempting to disassociate policy outcomes from the actor establishing
policy—may be difficult and unrealistic in quantitative studies. Psychologists have argued
that people rely on “simplifying heuristics” to evaluate information and that doing so may
bias the ways they interpret and act upon that information (Kahneman 2011, 7). For example,
cognitive shortcuts such as “availability” and “representativeness” suggest that policymakers
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do not consider all new information equally: “particularly vivid examples are more
influential than less striking events,” and policymakers may “draw unwarranted inferences
from a limited empirical basis” (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Weyland 2005, 2007, 2009;
Gilardi 2012). Ultimately, policymakers may or may not distinguish between policy success
and political consequences and “discount information that is not in line with their
preferences” (Gilardi 2010, 2012; Volden, Ting and Carpenter 2008).
Based on this work, I suggest that two other diffusion mechanisms discussed
throughout the literature—imitation and social construction, sometimes both classified as
forms of “emulation” and categorized separately from learning—may actually just be
modified manifestations of learning. As such, I believe it may be difficult to make a hard
distinction between learning and these two possible forms of emulation in consistently
quantifiable ways. However, I do attempt to develop hypotheses that may assess the ability of
these slightly different, albeit similar, mechanisms to predict policy adoption. With this in
mind, my foundational learning hypothesis simply seeks to capture the idea that the
availability of new information over time about a policy may influence policy adoption. I
assume that because countries can observe and interact with one another, policy adoptions
elsewhere increase the amount of information available to a country about the potential
implications of a policy.
H2: The likelihood of adopting religious restrictions increases as the number of restrictive
policies adopted throughout the world rises.

Imitation
Although some studies do not distinguish between different types of emulation, others
suggest that “imitation” is actor-centric whereas “social construction” is community-focused.
For example, Shipan and Volden (2008) distinguish between learning and imitation by
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arguing that “imitation involves a focus on the other government—what did that
government do and how can we appear to be the same?” Simmons and Elkins (2004) also
highlight how the perceived overall success of other countries (as opposed to just observable
policy-specific success) may incentivize emulation: “The apparent success of others may in
fact be a cognitive shortcut to assessing policy consequences; the relevant question in this
process is, ‘What policies are the high achievers pursuing?’” Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett
(2007) similarly argue that diffusion motivated by imitation may be reflective of power
asymmetry, but is founded more in a willing desire by both countries to reduce asymmetry.
Exploring one way countries may work to reduce this type of asymmetry, Susan Hyde
(2009) proposes that individual states can contribute to the formation and diffusion of
international norms through “signaling.” Hyde’s signaling theory suggests that “democracy
promoters” reward states they recognize as democratizing, in turn incentivizing governments
with uncertain regime types to “signal” their commitment to democracy in an effort to obtain
benefits. As all “true democrats” begin to adopt a common signal—in her study, inviting
international election monitors—she expects even “pseudo-democrats” to mimic the behavior
in an effort to mask their true type and probabilistically compete for the benefits associated
with democracy.
How might these theories extend to the adoption of restrictive religion policy? At a basic
level, I suggest that imitation is a form of learning from countries that are perceived as
politically or economically successful. Whereas Hyde focuses on the potential for regimes to
signal their intent to potential benefactors by mimicking the behavior of “true democracies,” I
would argue that the concept of “signaling” may equally apply in a different way: if “true”
democracies or other powerful countries that shape opportunities for alliances and aid
continue to adopt restrictive policies, they may implicitly “signal” to other regimes that such

20
policies are considered acceptable in practice. This approach may help to further explain
why countries sometimes appear to adopt conflicting positions (such as inviting election
monitors but ignoring their conclusions, or adopting a constitutional provision that protects
religious freedom yet continuing to legislate or otherwise restrict religious practice). As such,
I propose that the probability of policy adoption will increase as countries imitate relatively
“successful” or “powerful” countries that have adopted similar policies. Potential ways to
assess and measure this concept are discussed in more detail below.
H3: The likelihood of adopting religious restrictions increases as “successful” or
“powerful” countries adopt restrictive policies.
Social Construction
In his seminal piece, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” Alexander Wendt explains
that while both realism and liberalism disagree fundamentally about various aspects of
international relations, both primarily draw upon the idea of a “self-interested state as the
starting point for theory” (1992, 392). With this introduction, he argues that an examination
of constructed identities and associated interests should precede the assumption of selfinterested state. Since this assertion, the school of constructivist thought in international
relations has assumed that culture and meaning are socially constructed, suggesting that the
merits or limitations of political action may be culturally encoded. For example, one of the
causes proposed by Huntington (1991) in his theory regarding a “third wave of
democratization” assumed that changes in church doctrine and practice spread throughout
countries that shared a culturally similar, Catholic heritage; religious teachings were, in his
view, communicated across countries through the cultural network and thus interpreted with
special consideration, leading in part to the adoption of government policies to emphasize the
importance of individual rights following Vatican II. Some diffusion authors have
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acknowledged the rise of these types of theories in constructivist IR literature and have
since suggested that “social construction” can be a mechanism for policy diffusion.
Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007), for instance, suggest that the merits of a policy
are socially constructed through epistemic communities and reference groups, increasing the
probability of policy adoption following an adoption by a nation’s self-identified peers.
Simmons and Elkins (2004) further explain this assumption, highlighting the potentially
significant role of cultural reference groups in learning:
Learning takes place at least partially through analogy, and lessons are viewed as
more relevant to the extent to which a foreign case is viewed as analogous. …The
policies of culturally similar countries are perceived to (and in fact may) contain
highly relevant information on the appropriateness of a particular policy in a specific
context of shared values. This perceived similarity may provide a cognitive shortcut
for an individual… in a group decision-making context.
Simmons and Elkins’ original hypothesis about cultural similarity and diffusion (which
evaluated the influence of similarity on the spread of economic policy) has not been
extensively tested in systematic ways by other scholars, even though it seems reasonable to
hypothesize that cultural similarity across countries may increase the likelihood of policy
emulation. I believe this may be due in part to the difficulty of measuring the concept of
“cultural similarity” in quantitative studies. Although definitively understanding which
nations constitute a country’s self-identified peers may require in-depth qualitative or cultural
studies, potential ways to measure the concept of cultural similarity are discussed in more
detail below. Here, I attempt to test and extend Simmons and Elkins’ hypothesis by applying
the general concept to the potential diffusion of restrictive religion policy.
H4: The likelihood of adopting restrictive religion policies increases when culturally similar
countries adopt such a policy.
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EVALUATING DIFFUSION OF GOVERNMENT RELIGION POLICIES

What Counts? Measuring Government Regulation of Religion
To test these hypotheses, I adapt data from the Religion and State (RAS) Dataset
compiled by Jonathan Fox and others as a part of the Religion and State Project at Bar-Ilan
University (Akbaba and Fox 2011; Fox 2015, 2013, 2011b, 2009, 2006). This dataset
includes several variables that record the presence or absence of over one hundred different
kinds of religious regulations (and a basic measure of the level at which such legislation is
enforced), several indices measuring the overall level of government involvement in religion,
and the presence of a constitutional provision that codifies the separation of religion and state
or the specific establishment of a state religion for each country in the dataset. This study
specifically includes relevant and available observations from in the RAS dataset, which
spans 175 countries with data for each year between 1990 and 2008.
One potential limitation to the dataset is the tendency to emphasize government
practice over the adoption of specific laws. That is, in some cases a country may be coded as
adopting a restriction even if a law has not been passed so long as it is consistent government
practice to enforce such a restriction. This practice is explained further in this excerpt from
the RAS codebook:
It is important to emphasize that these codings focus on the relationship between
religion and the state apparatus. For a variable to be coded, there must either be a law
or a consistent government practice. In cases where the two contradict, consistent
government practice was coded. These codings also represent the practice of the
federal or national governments of states, and not practices by local governments.
However, if a large number of local or regional governments engage in a practice it is
also coded (Fox 2009).
Despite this potential uncertainty in the coded data, however, I believe the data can
still be used to evaluate the general trend of concern—that is, whether or not restrictions on
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religious practice are indeed diffusing across countries and if so, in what ways? As such, I
treat the data as representative of a policy adoption without attempting to distinguish whether
or not the new governmental norm is codified in law or simply manifest in consistent
government practice.
I largely accept this assumption recognizing that government religion policy can be
difficult to quantify.1 What, for instance, should be considered restrictive government
religion policy? Fox (2013) notes that while terms such as “‘religious discrimination’ and
‘religious freedom’ seem at first glance straightforward, they are not. Each has multiple
possible meanings and interpretations” (13). To operationalize these concepts, Sarkissian
suggests that “religious regulation can be defined broadly to include all laws and rules that
are enacted to govern religious affairs in a state, those that both support and oppose religion”
(2015, 27). Here, I agree with Sarkissian and others that regulations that are “intended to
repress religion and therefore… policies that restrict it” can include both overtly
discriminatory policies as well as policies that support or favor some forms of religious
expression (Sarkissian 2015, 27; Fox 2015).
Acknowledging the complex normative and scholarly debate surrounding what types
of policies constitute religious “restrictions,” I focused only on policy types that could fairly
clearly be categorized as restrictive based on the following assumptions, rather than including
all of the policies tracked in the RAS dataset.2 First, I consider discriminatory policies to be
those that clearly violate the principles articulated in the UN Declaration of Human Rights as
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For a more detailed discussion of the challenges associated with data collection and measurement when
studying religion and state, see Fox 2011b.
2

In future work, expanding the sample to include more policies from the RAS dataset may improve
statistical analysis by increasing the number of observations. For this project, however, time constraints and
2
In future work, expanding the sample to include more policies from the RAS dataset may improve
statistical analysis by increasing the number of observations. For this project, however, time constraints and
theoretical concerns—namely an effort to focus on restrictive policies rather than all forms of government
religion policy—suggested that the selection of a sample might be appropriate.
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cited in the introduction (that is, the right of an individual to “change his religion or belief”
and to “manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance”).
Second, I recognize that government support for certain religious groups or actions in the
form of funding or other resources can also “constitute religious repression,” as it “often
results in discrimination or restrictions against those who do not benefit from government
support” and “may also be intended to restrict the [favored] group itself” (Sarkissian 2015,
27).
With this in mind, I selected a sample of twenty specific types of policy from the
RAS dataset that may be considered representative of a government’s overall level of
restrictive religion policy. The original RAS dataset separately categorizes policies based on
whether or not they target minority, majority, or all religions, as well as whether or not they
are overtly restrictive or more implicitly regulatory. Although it may be interesting in future
research to determine if restrictive policies categorized by targeted group may diffuse in
different ways, this paper is designed to assess the spread of restrictions generally. As such,
an effort was made to reduce selection bias by including roughly the same number of policies
for comparison from each of the original RAS categories. In short, because the literature has
not yet examined the potential international diffusion of restrictive religion policy in a
general sense, my sample includes policies that may be categorized by their substantive goals
regardless of whether or not they target minorities exclusively or all religions generally. The
twenty policies I selected may be grouped into the following substantive categories, with
specific examples provided in Table 1:
1.

Restrictions on formal religious organizations (including religiouslyaffiliated or inspired political parties or unions);
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2.

Restrictions on religious speech and/or the dissemination of religious
materials;

3.

Restrictions on public observances of religion, including holidays and any
observation of the Sabbath or its equivalent;

4.

Restrictions on religious proselytizing; and

5.

Legislation that supports some forms of religious expression but may, as
described above, be used by the government in restrictive ways (i.e. the
presence of religious education in publicly-funded schools or the provision
of government funding for building, repairing, or maintaining religious
sites).

For each policy, the original RAS dataset simply provides information from year to
year about whether or not a policy is in place and the extent to which it is enforced. To assess
policy diffusion, however, the dependent variable of interest should capture whether or not a
nation adopts new policies over time. Available data on these policies are thus recoded
dichotomously to reflect years of policy adoption and combined across categories to ensure
that there are sufficient observations (at a country-year level of analysis) with which to test
the hypotheses.
This approach—of evaluating policy diffusion with categories of different types of
legislation instead of focusing on one specific policy—has also been applied in other
prominent studies of policy diffusion. This article employs the same logic as Shipan and
Volden (2008), who examine policy diffusion across cities throughout the United States by
evaluating anti-smoking policy adoption with three different categories of anti-smoking laws.
As they highlight, examining multiple policy choices in the same years for the same countries
allows a policy adoption to be considered a type of repeated event, as a policy in any of the
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categories could be adopted at any time in any order (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002;
Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld 1989; Shipan and Volden 2006, 2008).
In short, I first summarize the number of policies (of the twenty policies included in
the study) adopted by each country in each year. While many countries had years without any
policy adoptions, the maximum number of policies adopted in a given year by one country
was seven. Figure 1 highlights the number of policies adopted in each year of the study, and
Figure 2 notes that by the end of 2008, worldwide policy adoption (in the categories sampled)
totaled an additional 203 policies.
I then use this information to create a consolidated dependent variable that is initially
set equal to 0 and is then set equal to 1 in the years in which a country adopts additional
restrictions, resulting in 140 observations of adoption at a country-year level. Due to the
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I employ logistic regression for the purpose of
conducting standard binary event history analysis (as a commonly utilized tool throughout
diffusion literature) (Berry and Berry 1990; Wotipka and Ramirez 2008; Graham, Shipan and
Volden 2013).
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Assessing Diffusion Mechanisms
My general spatial diffusion hypothesis suggests that a country will be more likely to
adopt a restriction if its geographic neighbors have already done so. To test this hypothesis, I
construct the variable Geography, which captures the total number of policies adopted by
countries in the same geographic region between 1990 and the prior year (i.e. for 1996, it
represents the total number of policies adopted in the region between 1990 and 1995).
Geographic region is coded based on a country’s regional designation by the UN Statistics
Division (United Nations n.d.). Due to its broad nature, this variable may in turn capture
some of the effect of more specific mechanisms, but may be helpful in that sense as I can
then compare the goodness of fit of a model based on this variable as opposed to models
based on the more specific mechanisms. I expect this variable to have a positive coefficient,
assuming that the probability of adoption will increase as the number of restrictive policies
adopted by neighboring states increases.
Considering learning as a relatively broad category in and of itself, I attempt to first
evaluate the learning hypothesis with Learning, a variable that counts the total number of
restrictions adopted across the world between 1990 and the beginning of the year in question.
Although this measure could again potentially capture some aspects of imitation or social
construction, it fundamentally assumes that the higher the number of policies adopted across
the world, the more information there is available to a country interested in adopting such a
restriction, improving their understanding of potential consequences of the policy. Thus, I
expect Learning to have a positive coefficient: as the number of restrictive policies adopted
throughout the world increases, so to should the likelihood of future adoption.
Distinguishing between and measuring imitation and social construction is more
difficult. To do so, however, I return to an understanding of imitation as actor-centric and
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social construction as community-centric. As discussed above, I assume that imitation
would primarily be driven by attempts to emulate larger or more powerful countries that have
adopted similar restrictions. Different ways of operationalizing the concept of “powerful” or
“successful” countries, however, may have different theoretical implications. Joseph Nye
(2004, 1-2) argues,
Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few
understand it….Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define and
measure, but no less real for that. The dictionary tells us that power is the capacity to
do things. …The dictionary also tells us that power means having the capabilities to
affect the behavior of others to make those things happen. So more specifically,
power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants.
…But things are not as straightforward as they first appear. …Power always depends
on the context in which the relationship exists.
What is the relevant context of the relationships in this study? I find it unlikely that
“powerful” countries would deliberately exert some form of influence to convince a country
to adopt restrictive religion policies that limit personal freedoms. As such, I return to a
modified signaling theory as articulated above: whether intentionally or not, I argue that
when “powerful” countries that could influence others adopt restrictions, they signal to other
countries that those policies will not be challenged on the world stage.
To measure this potential phenomenon, I construct variables that assess the total
number of policies previously adopted by “powerful” countries. I suggest two possible
proxies that may capture which nations would be considered powerful or influential in this
sense: first, the extent to which a country controls a significant share of military and
economic resources available throughout the world, and second, whether or not a country is a
member of the OECD. While there is some overlap in the countries that will be considered
“powerful” between these two categories, they represent theoretically different perspectives.
The first measure—approximated here using the Composite Index of National Capability
developed for version five of the National Material Capabilities dataset in the Correlates of
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War project—more closely aligns with conventional definitions of “hard power” (Singer
1987). This variable totals the number of restrictive policies previously adopted by the thirtyfive countries with the highest share of power in the CINC database prior to the year in
question.
In contrast, OECD member countries are more likely associated with “soft power”—
leadership based on culture, values, etc.—as implied in the organization’s mission statement:
“to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around
the world” by a “shared commitment to market economies backed by democratic institutions
and focused on the well-being of citizens” (“About the OECD”). This variable totals the
number of restrictive policies previously adopted by OECD member countries prior to the
year in question. Given this emphasis on democratic institutions and freedoms, it would be
particularly interesting from a normative perspective if countries imitate OECD members in
adopting restrictive religion policies. In short, I propose two different variables that could
separately assess imitation as a diffusion mechanism. For each, I expect a positive
coefficient, assuming that a desire or willingness to emulate “powerful” countries will
increase the probability of adoption.
With respect to social construction, I primarily seek to test and extend the Simmons
and Elkins (2004) cultural similarity hypothesis as it applies to the adoption of restrictive
government religion policy. Simmons and Elkins measured cultural similarity in three ways:
1) whether or not a country shared the same dominant language, 2) whether or not the
country had a common colonial heritage, or 3) whether or not a country shared the same
dominant religion. Interestingly, they found the strongest support for diffusion among
countries with similar religious cultures, with less conclusive results for the influence of
former colonial background or dominant language.
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Returning to Maske and Volden’s (2011) assertion that diffusion mechanisms may
vary across policies with different attributes, however, I suggest that re-testing Simmons and
Elkins’ (2004) findings with different policy types is important for developing a better
understanding of the potential impact of social construction in policy diffusion. As such, I
measure cultural similarity in two ways similar to Simmons and Elkins. First, I use “politicogeographic” region codings from the V-Dem dataset as a proxy to group countries that have
common colonial history, institutions or language (Coppedge et al. 2016).3 Specifically,
politico-geographic region was defined in the codebook as regions based on “geographic
proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by
scholars in studies of democratization” (i.e. grouping post-Communist countries in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia together or grouping Australia and New Zealand in a single
category with Western Europe and North America). This variable, in particular, also builds
upon and refines more basic ideas of geographic diffusion. I anticipate that this variable will
have a positive effect. Figure 3 highlights the percentage of total policies adopted during the
time period by each politico-geographic region.
Second, I develop a measure to assess the relationship between countries with the
same dominant religion. This variable is constructed to count the number of previous
adopters with the same religious majority as the country (i.e. the number of predominantly
Sunni Muslim countries that have adopted a restriction prior to another predominantly Sunni
Muslim country).4 My codings are based on religious demographic statistics found in version
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While taken from the V-Dem database for this project, this variable was originally developed in the
Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017).
4
Because the demographic data on religious affiliations only exists in five year increments, annual codings
were inferred based on whatever the dominant religious group was at the previous measurement (i.e. if a
country was predominantly Catholic in 1990 but had a higher demographic share of “Other Christian” in
the 1995 data, it was coded as Catholic for years 1990-1994 and “Other Christian” from 1995-1999).
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1.1 of the World Religions dataset through the Correlates of War project; I identify a
country as one of 12 categories (Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Other Christian, Jewish, Sunni
Islam, Shia Islam, Other Islam, Buddhist, Hindu, Other (i.e. Confucian, Animist), NonReligious, and No Clear Majority) based on the religious group with the highest share of the
population (Maoz and Henderson 2013). I believe this measure in particular should have a
relatively strong, positive influence in this case: it may be even more reasonable to assume
that nations with similar religious cultures feel similarly about the relationship of religion and
state (relative to Simmons and Elkins’ (2004) assumptions and findings that similar religious
cultures may influence the adoption of economic policy).5
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Historians have long noted that dominant religious culture can strongly influence the relationship between
religion and state. For an example of this literature, see Kalkandjieva 2011.
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Controlling for Domestic Influences
To better assess the potential impact of diffusion mechanisms, I include several
controls for domestic factors that may influence government religion policy. First, I construct
a variable to control for the extent to which a country is democratic. In an effort to reduce the
likelihood of endogeneity, I create an index variable based on several indicators in the VDem dataset that exclude measures otherwise often included in proxies for democracy (such
as protections of civil liberties that may include measures of religious freedom or more
general protections for freedom of expression and association) (Coppedge et al. 2016).
Specifically, I equally weigh measures gauging the share of the adult population with
suffrage, the extent to which elections are held and can be considered "free and fair," whether
or not the chief executive is elected, and the extent to which the judiciary or legislature are
able to act independently and exercise checks and balances over executive power.6 I
anticipate that this variable will have a negative effect (as the level of democracy increases,
the likelihood of adopting a restriction falls).
As previous literature has not conclusively identified the impact of a constitutional
separation of religion and state (SRAS) clause on government religion policy, I separately
include a control variable from the Religion and State dataset which is set equal to 1 if such a
clause is present. However, I assume that this measure is more likely to influence the general
type of government religion policy in a country as opposed to the extent to which a country is
susceptible to the diffusion of policy, and thus anticipate that any (potentially negative) effect
will likely be mild and not significant.
Next, I include a control—Regime Duration—to account for the number of
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For more detailed information on these individual indicators, consult the V-Dem v. 6 Codebook for the
variables v2x_suffr, v2xel_frefair, v2x_accex, v2x_jucon, and v2xlg_legcon (Coppedge et al. 2016).

consecutive years of the current regime type in a country (Coppedge et al. 2016).7 Again, I
expect this variable to have a negative coefficient (that is, the longer a regime type remains
stable, the less likely a country will be to adopt additional restrictions). To control for
economic factors, I include the growth rate of GDP per capita using data from the World
Bank (2017). Finally, to account for possible time trends, I include a cubic polynomial
approximation of the number of years prior to failure or the end of the observation period
(Carter and Signorino 2010).
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While taken from the V-Dem database for this project, this variable was originally developed in Boix,
Miller, and Rosato (2013) and captures changes in government type (i.e. non-democracy to democracy)
rather than shifts between individual leaders in a government.
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RESULTS

Table 2 presents basic descriptive statistics for the variables included in analysis.
Although many diffusion scholars turn to basic logistic regression for event history analysis,
however, it is possible that standard logit results may be biased in this case. As reflected in
the mean value of the dependent variable in Table 2 (0.042, suggesting that the outcome of
interest was only observed approximately 4.2 percent of the time), this dataset may be
classified as capturing rare events: out of 3325 country-year observations, only 140 failures
were observed. King and Zeng (2001) note that when working with rare event data, a logit
model often compresses the estimated probabilities, potentially obscuring substantive effects.
They then propose a number of remedies for addressing such bias as well as reconceptualizing the substantive effect observed in original logit coefficients. As such, the
regression results included in the body of this paper were generated using King and Zeng’s
(1999, 2001) corrections for modeling rare events (Tomz, King and Zeng 1999). For
comparison, the output of standard logit models as well as graphs visualizing the changes in
predicted probabilities based on the uncorrected logit are included in the appendix.
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How are these variables related? Table 3 shows the correlation matrix between
different variables. Notably, the correlation matrix provides some support for my theoretical
assumption that imitation and social construction may just be modified forms of learning: in
particular, both ways I measure imitation are highly correlated with learning (at 0.988 and
0.986 respectively); the social construction variables are also moderately correlated (at 0.578
and 0.632 respectively). Similarly, the spatial diffusion variable (geography) and first proxy
for cultural similarity (politico-geographic region) are also highly correlated (0.716). Based
on both the theory and these correlation results, I do not include more than one of these
related mechanisms at a time in a logit model. None of the mechanism variables appear
closely correlated with the dependent variable or controls.
Table 4 presents the corrected logit coefficients and standard errors of rare events
models (Models 1-6) that separately assess each diffusion mechanism. Taken individually,
each mechanism is statistically significant to some degree, and as expected, all had a positive
effect on the odds of policy adoption.
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King and Zeng (2001) suggest that one of the best ways to interpret the substantive
significance of regression results in rare events models is to compare the percentage change
in relative risk between different values of a variable. 8 They argue that at a baseline, even a
ten to twenty percent increase in relative risk may be considered substantively important in
rare event studies. Based on this assumption, these results suggest a meaningful substantive
impact in addition to the statistical significance noted in Table 4. The strongest effect was
associated with imitation based on representations of power in the CINC database; holding
other factors constant, the change in relative risk between the 25th and 75th percentile was
74.1 percent. Measures of general learning and the imitation of OECD countries had the next
highest impact, with a 57.9 percent change in the likelihood of adoption as more countries
around the world adopted restrictive policies and a 47 percent change as the number of
policies adopted by OECD members increased. As countries within the same geographic
region adopted restrictive policies (assuming some form of spatial diffusion), the increase in
relative risk was 30.1 percent. Finally, both measures of social construction presented the
smallest (albeit still notable) differences in relative risk: The adoption of policies within the
same politico-geographic region was associated with an increase the predicted probability of
adoption of 21.1 percent; as countries with the same religious majority adopted restricted
policies, the change in relative risk was 15.8 percent.
Coefficients for the control variables largely supported the theoretical assumptions
outlined above. Notably, the control measure for democracy was the strongest and only
statistically significant control with a negative coefficient in all models as predicted; holding
other factors constant, democracy was consistently associated with a decrease of
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For each mechanism, I calculated the percent change in relative risk (that is, in the probability of
adoption) between values at the 25th percentile and 75th percentile using the formula recommended by
King and Zeng (2001): 100 * [rr – 1], where rr is the relative risk calculated in STATA 12 following a rare
events regression.
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approximately 80 percent in the odds of adoption. Regime duration and economic growth
similarly held negative coefficients although statistically insignificant. As anticipated, a
separation of religion and state clause was not a significant predictor, but maintained a
positive coefficient across all six models. All in all, the calculated p values associated with
Wald χ2 statistics for all six models suggest that for each model, a null hypothesis assuming
no effect of the variables included should be rejected in favor of these models that account to
some extent for policy diffusion across countries. In short, these results provide moderate
support for the assumption that restrictive government religion policy is diffusing across
countries in some way.
How should these potential diffusion mechanisms be compared? While previous
diffusion literature often combines all proposed mechanisms in a final model to isolate odds
ratios or statistical significance when taken together, I argue that this may not be the best
approach. For instance, as noted above, mechanisms that may differ theoretically in
important ways but are highly or moderately correlated (such as general measures of learning
compared to modified forms of learning such as imitation of specific actors) could fail to
achieve significance when assessed together in the same model.
The results presented in Table 5—where Models 7-10 attempt to compare learning,
imitation, or social construction mechanisms to geography—provide further support for this
assumption: even when less closely-related theoretical concepts (yet still moderately
correlated variables) are tested together, almost all significance for diffusion mechanisms is
eliminated while a control for democracy remains strongly predictive. These apparently
“negligible” results, however, may still have substantive significance if considered outside
the boundaries of conventional statistical significance (Rainey 2014). For instance, similar
comparative models developed as a purely theoretical check (which include only
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international diffusion variables without domestic controls—see Table 6) continue to
provide statistical support for various mechanisms (Achen 2002, 2005).
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CONCLUSION

Taken together, these results provide some support for the idea that global restrictions
on religious freedom are not only increasing, but that the increase in policy adoption may be
partially explained by international diffusion of ideas rather than exclusively occurring as a
result of domestic factors. This extends the current body of literature on the relationship
between religion and state and on the origins of government religion policy, which has so far
focused almost entirely on internal determinants of policy. These findings also extend the
diffusion literature by suggesting that mechanisms commonly proposed as independent—
such as learning, imitation, and social construction—may be more closely interrelated than
they are perhaps always treated. Yet the finding that many diffusion mechanisms identified
by other scholars as largely separate can be highly interrelated complicates previous research.
In short, the theoretical discussion advanced in the paper merits additional
examination in future work. Are differences in findings across the literature primarily driven
by differences in the operationalization and measurement of concepts? Is it really possible to
accurately disentangle social construction, learning, and imitation? Or should these
mechanisms be reframed to examine an interaction of factors? Can qualitative studies or case
studies shed further light on these findings and help to better distinguish the roles of these
mechanisms in international policy diffusion? Could scholars actually learn more about
diffusion by interacting domestic and international factors (i.e. the level of democracy
interacted with measures of imitation based on hard power)?
Finally, what can be learned about diffusion by looking beyond simple policy
adoption? In particular, I believe that examining the extent to which a policy is enforced or
its duration in practice may further illuminate the strength and longevity of policy diffusion,
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similar to Shipan and Volden’s (2008) conditional and temporal effects hypotheses. All in
all, understanding the diffusion of restrictions of religious freedom may complicate the
growing literature that has traced the diffusion of political and economic liberalism over the
past several decades.
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The following tables and figures present the uncorrected (standard) logistic
regression results corresponding to those reported in the paper above. Table 7 compares with
Table 4; Figures 4 through 9 plot the change in predicted probabilities associated with the
logistic models estimated in Table 7. Tables 8 and 9 correspond with Tables 5 and 6 in the
main text, respectively.
The uncorrected results may be summarized as follows: Some of the strongest effects
were associated with the imitation of OECD countries and spatial diffusion: holding other
factors constant, the odds of adoption increased by 10.8 percent and the predicted probability
of adoption increased from .036 to .078 when OECD countries had previously adopted
restrictive policies. Similarly, the predicted probability of adoption increased from .037 to
.093 as countries within the same geographic region adopted restrictive policies and the odds
of adoption increased, on average, by 3.5 percent. Next, the impact of imitation based on
representations of power in the CINC database was an increase in the predicted probability of
adoption from .028 to .076; here, however, the percentage change in the odds of adoption
was 2.8 percent. Both proxies of social construction produced similar results: the adoption of
policies within the same politico-geographic region was associated with an increase the
predicted probability of adoption from .037 to .071 and a 1.2 percent change in the odds. As
countries with the same religious majority adopted restricted policies, the odds of adoption
increased by 1.1 percent and the predicted probability of adoption rose from .04 to .086.
Finally, as countries learn from the adoption of policies worldwide, the predicted probability
of adoption increased from .030 to .074 and odds of adoption only increase by roughly .5
percent.
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